At this year’s Munich Security Conference, the tone from European leaders suggested more than routine diplomatic friction. It pointed to a structural shift in the transatlantic relationship.
“Some lines have been crossed that cannot be uncrossed anymore,” said Ursula von der Leyen, capturing a mood of unease that ran through the gathering at Munich’s Bayerischer Hof hotel.
Tensions between Washington and European capitals have been building since Donald Trump returned to the White House. His proposal to annex Greenland, an autonomous territory of Denmark, intensified doubts in Europe about the durability of US security guarantees under NATO. While American officials insist that the alliance remains intact, rhetoric and omissions in Munich reinforced European concerns.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio adopted a measured tone, saying Washington wanted cooperation. Yet he avoided explicit references to NATO, Russia or the war in Ukraine — issues central to European security calculations. With Russia’s invasion entering its fifth year, many European leaders now view Moscow as a long-term threat requiring sustained military preparedness.
The response in Munich was clear: Europe intends to assume greater responsibility for its own defence.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer pledged to strengthen what they described as a “European pillar” within NATO. The concept envisions a more capable and autonomous European force structure that complements — but does not entirely depend on — US military backing.
In theory, the objective aligns with Trump’s long-standing demand that Europe shoulder more of the burden. His administration has indicated that while Washington would maintain its nuclear umbrella and commitment to NATO’s mutual defence clause, European states should take primary responsibility for conventional defence on the continent.
Yet European leaders increasingly view self-reliance as insurance against potential US disengagement. Merz confirmed he had opened discussions with Macron on expanding European nuclear deterrence arrangements — a sensitive topic given that France holds the only fully independent nuclear arsenal within the European Union. Britain’s Trident system, though operationally British, relies heavily on US technology and maintenance.
Defence spending has risen sharply. According to von der Leyen, European outlays have increased nearly 80% since before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. NATO members agreed last year to raise core defence spending targets to 3.5% of GDP, alongside an additional 1.5% for broader security investments.
Joint projects are multiplying. France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Sweden signed a letter of intent advancing the European Long-range Strike Approach, aimed at developing deep-strike missile capabilities. Coalitions are also forming around ballistic missile defence and air-launched munitions.
Still, ambition outpaces cohesion. The French-German-Spanish Future Combat Air System remains stalled amid disputes over industrial work-sharing. Debates continue over whether EU-funded defence initiatives should prioritise European manufacturers or remain open to external suppliers — a fault line between Paris’s “buy European” stance and Berlin’s more flexible approach.
Against this backdrop, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy reminded delegates of the stakes. Ukraine endured more than 6,000 drone attacks and 150 missile strikes last month alone. “Weapons evolve faster than political decisions meant to stop them,” he said.
Munich did not mark a formal rupture between Europe and the United States. But it underscored a recalibration. European capitals are preparing for a future in which American leadership is less predictable — and in which their own capacity to deter aggression must stand on firmer ground.
